Chapter One
A WIDE WORLD OF RACISMS
It’s a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast    or the brown man.
—Austin Anson, 
California Grower-Shipper
Vegetable Association, 1942    
World War II was not a race war, but it was—to an extent that is often overlooked—a conflict in which race played a central role, from start to finish and in every theater of combat. To speak    of a “race war,” in the conventional sense, is to imply a military    struggle for supremacy between two groups who perceive themselves as    being racially distinct. The Second World War was far too complex to    be contained within such a clear-cut rubric: this conflict was just    as much about territorial expansion, economic resources, and global    hegemony as it was about racial purity; it ended up pitting Asians    against other Asians, and led Germany into a mortal struggle with    Great Britain—a nation categorized by the Nazis as falling clearly    within the Aryan fold.
Nevertheless, if we conduct a careful survey of this global conflict,    bearing the concept of race in mind, we may be astonished at the    result. It is hard to find many significant aspects of this war in    which racial distinctions did not play an important role. Racial    ideas shaped both German and Japanese war aims, and helped spur these    two peoples to take the aggressive actions that precipitated military    hostilities. Racial prejudices on the Allied side led to a gross    underestimation of Japanese capabilities in 1941—a misperception for    which Britain and the United States paid dearly in December 1941 and    the early months of 1942. Racial distinctions permeated the American    war economy and the American military; they also led to one of the    greatest breaches of constitutional governance in the nation’s    history, the forced internment of a racially demarcated subset of    American citizens. Racial hatreds animated soldiers on both sides in    the Pacific War, leading to unprecedented levels of brutality in the    conduct of combat and the treatment of prisoners. And racism, of    course, lay at the heart of the Nazi genocide that has marked World    War II as a chapter of unique horror in human history.
This chapter explores some of the manifold ways in which racial    thinking shaped the Second World War; it is an exploration that    continues in subsequent chapters, as we take up such diverse subjects    as the “bystander” phenomenon during the Holocaust; the psychological    mechanisms that allowed seemingly ordinary Germans to become mass    murderers; the stereotyped imagery surrounding kamikazes; the clash    between Germans and Russians on the Eastern Front; the atomic bombing    of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the war crimes trials at Nuremberg and    Tokyo; the postwar occupation of Japan; and the enduring    transformation that the war brought about for racist ideas and    practices around the world, in the decades since 1945.    
In order to understand World War II, we need to understand why three    disparate and physically far-removed nations—Germany, Italy, and Japan—ended up fighting as part of a single alliance, the Tripartite Pact    of 1940. What did they perceive themselves to be fighting for? And    how did this bind them together? There are two ways to go about    answering these kinds of questions. The first approach lies in the    realm of politics, economics, and military power: we trace what these    three nations wanted by looking back on their diplomacy, their wars,    their economic troubles, the domestic political upheavals they    experienced in the period twenty or thirty years before the outbreak    of the Second World War.
This is a perfectly valid approach (and we duly take it up in chapters Two and Three), but by itself it is not enough. If we really want to get at    the motivations of the Germans, Japanese, and Italians, then we have    to go deeper, into the realm of ideas. Ultimately, it is here that    the war really began—in a basic set of attitudes that came to be    quite widely held throughout Europe and the United States (and later    in Japan) around the last decades of the nineteenth century, a    cultural current that historians call Social Darwinism.
Charles Darwin published his 
Origin of Species in 1860. At its heart    lay the notion of natural selection—the evolutionary process    resulting from the interaction between random genetic mutations in    animal populations and the special challenges and opportunities    presented by particular habitats. It amounted to a genuine    intellectual revolution. But this complex, subtle notion came to be    popularized, in the decades after 1860, as “survival of the fittest”—   a much simpler, cruder vision of all nature’s creatures engaged in a    ruthless competition for scarce resources. All life, everywhere, was    unavoidably caught in this relentless struggle for survival, for    domination of the available ecological niches.
From here, it was a relatively easy intellectual move to take these    ideas out of their context in the physical world of zoology and    botany and reapply them to the human world of society and history.    Hence the term “Social Darwinism”—survival of the fittest, readapted    as an interpretive guide to understanding all human interactions,    from the behaviors of individuals to the mass movements of entire    nations or races. Everywhere the message was the same: If I don’t    dominate you, you’ll dominate me. If I survive, it will have to be at    someone else’s expense. Resources are scarce, and only the most    efficient competitors—the smartest, the strongest, the most ruthless—   will live to struggle another day. Whenever you see two groups of    people coexisting peacefully, it is merely an illusion, or a    temporary truce. Underneath the surface, they cannot help but be    secretly preparing a coup against each other. Such are the realities    of Human Nature.
Social Darwinist thinkers of the late nineteenth century also added a    twist to this logic, an intriguing moral tone. If I have succeeded at    dominating everyone else, then this is a sign that I 
deserve to be    the leader, the privileged arbiter of everyone else’s destinies. By    exercising domination over others, by mercilessly weeding out the    weak and unfit, I am performing a higher service to the species as a    whole. I am keeping the species strong and vigorous, primed for    successful competition against other species. This process may appear    cruel at times, but the logic of natural selection looks to the    species, not to the individual. Weak and unfit individuals place an    unacceptable burden on the rest of their group, and though it may    appear heartless, they must be periodically selected and cast away,    if the collective organism is to remain dynamic and healthy.
Once one had accepted this line of argument, it became easy to apply    the logic to entire racial groups. In the millennial struggle, the    Social Darwinists argued, some races had clearly emerged as superior    competitors. How do you tell which races are better suited to rule    and to dominate than others? Simply look and see who’s on top of the    heap. By definition, they are the fittest, and therefore the ones who    are also morally justified in exercising control over all the rest.    This is Social Darwinism in a nutshell.
It is worth noting that this ideology was not born in Germany, Italy,    or Japan, but rather in England and France.2 Thinkers like Gustave Le    Bon in France or Herbert Spencer in England—or, in the United States,    the popular writer William Graham Sumner—were among the key    proponents of this ideology during the late nineteenth century.    Social Darwinism proved attractive for many reasons. At one level, it    was refreshingly simple and straightforward, so that just about    anyone could grasp it: “Either dominate or be dominated; it may not    be pretty, but that’s the way life is.” At a more visceral level, it    was also flattering to think of oneself (or one’s social group) as    King of the Hill. Finally, it meshed neatly with the widespread    phenomenon of imperialism, conveniently justifying all kinds of    excursions into the rest of the world, subjugating other peoples in    the name of Progress and the Higher Good of the Species. The fact    that Europeans had planted their flags all over Asia, Africa, and the    Middle East could be easily explained by this relatively accessible    and simple rationale: “We Europeans are superior to all other peoples    on earth. It is our right to go and conquer them. In fact, it is our    duty to do so, for in conquering them we are bringing them the    benefits of our superior civilization: our religion, medicine,    technology, customs, literature—everything that makes us so obviously    more advanced than they, the primitive ones.”
In some cases, moreover, the Social Darwinist thinkers added the    piquancy of paranoia to this heady mix of ideas. It is certainly    true, they argued, that the non-European races are weaker and less    advanced than us white Europeans, but the plain fact is that they    reproduce like rabbits. A real possibility exists of their swamping    us by their sheer numbers, the way parasites or viruses can    eventually overwhelm a healthy animal’s body. Hence, we have to move    aggressively in preempting them from gaining too much ground,    bringing them firmly under our tutelage, so that we can restrain not    only their actions, but their reproductive rates as well. We have to    master them completely, assuming full control over their lives,    before they simply overwhelm us.
Since the nineteenth century, a long succession of critics have    passionately argued against the Social Darwinist vision, denouncing    it as dangerous and simplistic nonsense. Their key argument has been    that the principles of natural selection discovered by Darwin only    applied within the realm of animals and plants. Animals obeyed    instincts, the inflexible behavior patterns with which they were    born; they submitted blindly to the demands and limitations imposed    on them by their biology and their surroundings. Animals could    certainly adapt, through natural selection, but this was not a matter    of conscious, deliberate choice: it was an unconscious process that    
happened to them collectively over many generations, not something    they undertook as individuals acting on their own initiative.
Human beings were fundamentally different, according to the opponents    of Social Darwinism, because humans inhabited a culturally mediated    social world. Here, one entered the realm of free will, of deliberate    reshaping of environments. Humans were not 
only animals: they also    had language, ethics, religion, complex social networks of    cooperation, elaborate legal systems to regulate their competition.    Concepts like justice or morality played at least as important a role    in shaping the human world as did the struggle to get ahead: both    these forces, competition and cooperation, combined to give humans    the power they enjoyed over their physical environment. Precisely    because the human world was qualitatively different from that of the    animals, applying the same set of rules to both realms could not help    but yield fundamental errors and contradictions.
Many Europeans, however—especially in the late nineteenth century—   remained unaware of this critique, and found the adaptation of    Darwinian ideas to the human world quite compelling. In the half-   century following 1860, the Social Darwinist ideology became highly    influential throughout Europe and America (and later in Japan as    well): ultimately, one of the most important converts to this grim    worldview was Adolf Hitler himself.
Hitler was in many ways an extremely complex, devious, enigmatic    person; yet in one respect he possessed a character trait that    rendered him predictable and transparent: he saw nearly everything in    the light of this Social Darwinist vision. For him, human life, at    its deepest essence, was about ruthless, unremitting competition. At    the level of individuals, it was Me against You; at the level of    collectivities, it was Our Group against Your Group.
One anecdote from the last days of Hitler’s life is particularly    revealing in this regard. It was March 1945, and the Russians were    closing in on his bunker in Berlin. The Third Reich lay in ruins all    around him, and he had finally given up hope that any of the secret    weapons he’d been frantically pursuing might still emerge, like a    deus ex machina, to save Germany. Hitler called in Albert Speer, his    economics minister, and issued a scorched-earth order calling for the    total destruction of any surviving assets that might prove useful to    Germany’s enemies—factories, bridges, mines, railroads. Speer was    appalled: How would the German people live after the war, he asked    his führer, if such a policy were implemented? Hitler replied: “There    is no need to consider the basis for even a most primitive existence.    On the contrary, it is better to destroy even that, and to destroy it    ourselves. The nation has proved itself weak, and the future belongs    to the stronger Eastern nation.”3 The great life-or-death struggle    between Aryans and Slavs had played itself out: the Aryans had failed    in the contest, and now deserved to disappear from the earth. Even in    the face of death, Social Darwinism gave Hitler a handle for making sense of the world that was    crashing down around him on all sides. It must have been an agonizing    choice, but in the end he preferred to cut himself loose from his own    sense of Aryan superiority, rather than relinquish the pitiless    vision that had imparted fundamental orientation and purpose to his    life.
This worldview of unending competition among peoples is not, in    itself, enough to explain why World War II occurred, but it amounts    to what philosophers call a “necessary condition” for the war. The    Japanese, Germans, and Italians, despite all the profound differences    in their cultures and histories, shared a fundamental set of    ambitions in common: to redress perceived injustices and raw deals of    the past; to stop being treated as second-class citizens; and    ultimately, to climb to their rightful place at the top of the world    heap.
Japan, after centuries of isolation, wanted to be a great power and    colonial empire like France and Great Britain. The Japanese people    perceived themselves as being isolated on relatively small island    territories, confined in living space, and intolerably vulnerable to    military and economic strangulation. Japanese elites felt rage at the    condescending and racist treatment they had received at the hands of    Europeans and Americans, who openly regarded Japan as a second-class    nation.
Germany in the 1930s was still seething with bitterness and    humiliation at the loss of the First World War and the harsh peace    treaty of Versailles. Hitler promised, most significantly, not only    to rescue the German economy from the woes of the Great Depression,    but to lift the nation back to its rightful place at the very front    rank of international power.
Italy, after centuries of foreign occupation and internal strife, had    only achieved national unity as recently as 1870. Amid deep    disappointment with the outcome of the First World War, and incipient    social and economic chaos in the early 1920s, Benito Mussolini swept    to power, promising the Italians that he would regain for them the    glory of the old Roman Empire.								
									 Copyright © 2006 by Michael Bess. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.